Categorical Approach Update

Posted by on May 1, 2018 in Blog

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018): The Court held that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §16’s crime-of-violence definition is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson. And because the vagueness doctrine extends to immigration statutes, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(F) is also invalid to the extent it defines “aggravated felony” to include a crime of violence under §16(b)’s residual clause.

United States v. Stitt, Supreme Court Case No. 17-765 & United States v. Sims, Supreme Court Case No. 17-766: The Court granted cert to address this question: “Whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as ‘burglary’ under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).”

Stephen v. Sessions, __ Fed.Appx. __, 2018 WL 1601502 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2018): The Court held that Arizona drug convictions under ARS §13-1001 and §13-3407(A)(7) qualified as aggravated felonies.

United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc): The Court held that Missouri convictions for second-degree burglary (Mo. Rev. Stat. §569.170) cannot qualify as ACCA violent felonies.

United States v. Kinney, __ F.3d __, 2018 WL 1903772 (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018): The Court held that North Dakota’s burglary statute (NDCC §12.1-22-02) is overbroad and indivisible such that a conviction under that statute cannot qualify as an ACCA violent felony.

United States v. Gieswein, __ F.3d __, 2018 WL 1789933 (10th Cir. Apr. 16, 2018): The Court held than an Oklahoma conviction for lewd molestation (21 Okla. Stat. Ann. §1123) did not qualify as a forcible sex offense / crime of violence under U.S.S.G. §4B1.2.

Brock-Miller v. United States, 887 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 2018): The Court held that an Indiana conviction for possession of a hypodermic syringe or needle adapted for drug use (Ind. Code Ann. §16-42-19-18) was not a felony drug offense for purposes of 21 U.S.C. §841(b).

Ramirez v. Sessions, __ F.3d __, 2018 WL 1802391 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2018): The Court held that obstruction of justice under Virginia law (Va. Code Ann. §18.2-460(A)) is not crime involving moral turpitude.